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Abstract 
Network robustness against attacks has been widely studied in fields as diverse as the Internet, 
power grids and human societies. Typically, in these studies, robustness is assessed only in terms 
of the connectivity of the nodes unaffected by the attack. Here we put forward the idea that the 
connectivity of the affected nodes can play a crucial role in properly evaluating the overall 
network robustness and its future recovery from the attack.  Specifically, we propose a dual 
perspective approach wherein at any instant in the network evolution under attack, two distinct 
networks are defined: (i) the Active Network (AN) composed of the unaffected nodes and (ii) the 
Idle Network (IN) composed of the affected nodes. The proposed robustness metric considers 
both the efficiency of destroying the AN and the efficiency of building-up the IN. We show, via 
analysis of both prototype networks and real world data, that trade-offs between the efficiency of 
Active and Idle network dynamics give rise to surprising crossovers and re-ranking of different 
attack strategies, pointing to significant implications for decision making.   
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Recent developments in understanding the structure and dynamics of networks have 
transformed research in many fields, ranging from protein interactions in a cell to page 
connectivity in the World Wide Web and relationships in human societies
1, 2
.  Although these 
complex networks have different evolution rules, many exhibit a universal scale-free topology 
wherein the highly connected nodes, although sparse, dominate the connectivity of the network
2
.  
Network robustness against failure and attack has been widely studied, and different strategies to 
manage perturbation spread within the network have been suggested 
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
. The existing 
works focused mainly on the connectivity of the nodes unaffected by an attack while the 
connectivity of the affected nodes has received minimal attention.  However, it is conceivable 
that for some processes such as disease or information spreading, river contamination, etc., the 
dynamic connectivity of the affected nodes (e.g., small vs. large clusters of sick people, or 
contaminated streams) is of interest too as its structure can exert significant feedbacks to the 
unaffected nodes, can determine the overall system “health”, or can establish the propensity of 
the system to future perturbations.  In this paper, we highlight the importance of incorporating 
information from both the Active Network (unaffected nodes) and Idle Network (affected nodes) 
into making assessments of the network robustness and evaluating possible interventions in 
response to an attack.    
Consider a network N that consists of nodes {ni}, i = 1,…,T connected by edges {(ni,nj)}. 
We focus on a process of sequential node removal, also called an attack. The process starts at t = 
0 with the original network N. At each discrete time step t > 0 it eliminates a suitably chosen 
node ni and all edges (ni,) connected to this node, resulting in the set of nodes and edges that 
have been unaffected and thus are active at t, called the Active Network NA(t). This sequential 
node removal can mimic a multitude of actual processes operating on networks and having a 
 3 
binary outcome, e.g. healthy species in a biological community that may become sick, clean 
streams in a river network that may become contaminated, people that may learn particular 
information, etc. We also consider the Idle Network NI(t) that consists of the nodes that have 
been removed from N up to time t, together with all the edges from N among these idle nodes. 
Accordingly, a sequential node removal process D results in the following decomposition of the 
network N:  
D: N  {NA(t), NI(t)}, t = 1,…,T.                                               (1) 
Observe that the union of the nodes in the NA(t) and NI(t) matches the set of nodes in the original 
network N. At the same time, the union of edges from NA(t) and NI(t) is only a subset of the 
edges in the original network, since the latter may also include some edges between nodes in the 
NA(t) and NI(t) representing the possible interactions between the AN and IN. In other words, the 
pair {NA(t), NI(t)} cannot be used in general to reconstruct N; although NA(t) is uniquely 
determined by {N, NI(t)} and NI(t) is uniquely determined by {N, NA(t)}.  
The existing literature mainly focuses on studying connectivity metrics on NA(t) to 
evaluate the robustness of the network N, i.e., the ability of N to preserve connectivity and thus 
functionality under attack.  We assert that a robustness metric of the network N should consider 
both the dynamics of NA(t) and NI(t). We begin by illustrating the importance of this dual 
perspective by considering an example of node removal in a simple line-connected network of 
length T = 7 shown in Fig. 1.  The connectivity of a network is assessed here by the size S(t) of 
its largest cluster; this is a conventional metric used in many previous studies 
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
. We 
implemented a strategy of node removal that is the most efficient in decreasing the size SA(t) of 
the maximal cluster of the AN (Fig. 1a). During the first three time steps the max cluster size 
decreased from 7 to 1. However, this particular strategy of node removal is not at all efficient 
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with respect to building-up the connectivity of the IN (Fig. 1b): in the first three time steps the 
maximum cluster size SI(t) merely increased from 0 to 1.   
Quantitatively, the efficiency EA of a node removal strategy in destroying the AN can be 
defined as: 
EA =
AA
Amax
=
T - t - SA (t)( )
t=0
T
å
T - t( )
t=0
T
å
=1-
2
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T
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Here AA is the area between SA(t) and the diagonal staircase (T-t) as in Fig. 1c and Amax is the area 
below the diagonal staircase.  Similarly, the efficiency EI of building the idle network can be 
defined as (Fig. 1d): 
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å                        (3) 
We propose to define the network robustness RN as a function of both the efficiency EA of 
destroying the connectivity of the AN and efficiency EI of building-up the connectivity of the IN: 
RN = f(EA,EI)                                                                    (4) 
with a suitable function f non-increasing in both arguments.  In the absence of specific reasons 
for non-linearity, a simple metric of network robustness would be:  
                             ,    (5) 
where   is the weight given to the efficiency of the AN while (1-  ) is the complementary 
weight given to that of the IN. Using   =1 leads to a particular definition that is currently used in 
the literature to guide, for example, decisions on most effective strategies of attack or to assess 
recovery rates under a given attack 
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
. While this may be a good approximation for some 
systems, it is restrictive for many others.  For example, the robustness of the Internet has been 
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studied under different attacks
4,5
, wherein the routers are the nodes of the network, and the wire 
or wireless connections are the edges.  The robustness of these systems to withstand an attack 
has been assessed by considering only the connectivity of the unaffected routers, i.e., the sooner 
the network under attack losses connectivity, the less robust it is. This hypothesis is considering 
only one of the perspectives, i.e., connectivity of the AN, to assess the robustness of the overall 
network (   ). However, relevant information is disregarded: different scenarios of the 
connectivity in the IN for the same connectivity in the AN are possible and this can result in 
different “effective” overall system robustness. For instance, if the failed routers are scattered 
(low SI) compared to being clustered on specific parts of the network (high SI), different     
values could be considered to capture possible trade-offs on the relative importance of the 
connectivity of the AN and IN in assessing the overall system robustness to the attack. Similar 
examples apply to balancing the spread of one ecological species at the expense of another, 
containment of contaminated waters in water corridors or in spreading of diseases and 
information. The implications of the above trade-offs for decision-making are apparent.  
To illustrate some subtle and unexpected consequences that arise in considering a dual 
perspective in defining network robustness under an attack, three types of networks and three 
different strategies of node elimination (attack strategies) are studied. Network 1: A square 
lattice of T = 10,000 nodes arranged in a Von Neumann neighborhood (i.e., each node having 
four neighbors); see Fig. 2a. Network 2: A Tokunaga self-similar tree
9
 (T-tree) with parameters 
(a, c) = (1, 2) (see Fig. 2e). Network 3: A Barabasi-Albert (BA) scale-free network, a system 
with heterogeneous node degree distribution that exhibits high connectivity and contains intricate 
structures due to the presence of loops.  The Tokunaga self-similar tree is known to describe a 
critical binary Galton-Watson process
10
 and level-set tree representation of a symmetric random 
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walk or regular Brownian motion
11
. Tokunaga trees with a broad range of parameter values have 
found wide applicability in describing the topology of river networks
9, 12, 13
, biological networks 
(leaves and cardiovascular systems)
 14
 and clustering of earthquake aftershocks
15
. In this paper 
we use Tokunaga trees of order   = 6. Each Horton-Strahler branch12, 16 in the tree represents a 
node. The BA network incorporates preferential attachment and growth mechanisms
2
.  We 
construct a BA network using an initially connected network of m0 = 3 nodes and adding a new 
node with m = 2 links per time step, until T = 1,000 nodes are added (Fig. 2i). The examined 
networks are classified according to the node degree distribution into homogeneous (lattice) and 
heterogeneous (T-tree and BA network).   
In each system, we examine three strategies of node removal. Strategy 1: A random 
failure (RF) removes nodes at random using a discrete uniform distribution over all the active 
nodes. Strategy 2: A targeted attack (TA) assigns a removal probability to a vertex proportional 
to its degree of connectivity in the AN. Strategy 3: A random spreading (RS) removes the first 
node at random as in RF; afterwards, at each time step one node connected to an eliminated node 
is randomly removed.  The evolution of the largest cluster size S under progressive node removal 
is examined using 100 simulations. Figure 2 shows S(t) as a function of time in the AN and IN 
for one realization (representative of all simulations) for each network and attack; the time t is 
normalized to be equal to the fraction of the removed nodes. The first observation is that the rate 
of increase of the largest cluster size in the IN is not the same, in general, as the rate of decay of 
the largest cluster size in the AN. A lattice network under RS is an exception – the symmetry 
here (with respect to S(t) = 0.5) is expected by construction and it can only be altered by abrupt 
jumps in S(t) due to finite size effects.  We also notice symmetry of SA(t) and SI(t) with respect to 
the vertical axis t = 0.5 that is only observed for a homogeneous lattice network (under any 
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attack) and random failure (applied to any network) and can be expressed as EA + EI ≈ 1 (see 
Table 1). The symmetry is not obvious in Fig. 2f due to the large jumps of the largest cluster 
size; although it can be shown statistically via the efficiency values (Table 1). Having the 
complementary values of EA and EI has an obvious but important implication: the more efficient 
a strategy according to one perspective (e.g., destroying the connectivity in the AN), the less 
efficient it is according to the other (e.g., building-up the connectivity in the IN). Another 
important observation is that for T-trees, the connectivity of the AN is destroyed faster, and the 
connectivity of the IN is built up slower, than in the BA network. Finally, the perfect efficiency 
of the random spreading in the Idle network is a consequence of its definition (SI grows linearly). 
The robustness (equation 5) of a network does change with  , as illustrated in Fig. 3 (top 
panels). Notably, the robustness may deviate substantially from the case   = 1 (marked by stars 
in Fig. 3), which is examined in most of the existing studies
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
. Surprisingly, a more 
general definition (equation 5) not only gives different numerical values of the robustness, but 
also may result in robustness crossovers – alternative ranking of attack strategies depending on 
the value of  . For example, in a lattice network, a crossover occurs at   = 0.5, with RN,RS > RN,RF 
> RN,TA  for   > 0.5, and  RN,TA > RN,RF > RN,RS for   < 0.5 (here the second lower index refers to 
the attack type).  A crossover between RN,TA and RN,RS is also observed for T-trees at    0.68 as 
well as for the BA network at    0.17. Hence, an interplay between the AN and IN introduces a 
whole new dimension in the study of robustness, which cannot be reproduced by exclusively 
examining the AN.  At the same time, some general observations remain consistent with 
previous works when   = 1, in particular those showing that networks are more robust under 
random failure than targeted attack 
3, 5, 7
.  Other observations for   = 1 are: (1) for both the 
heterogeneous networks, RN is highest for random failure, followed by random spreading and 
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targeted attack; (2) the robustness in homogeneous networks is highest for random spreading, 
followed by random failure and targeted attack; (3) the RN -value for random spreading and 
homogeneous networks is approximately equal to 1 since SI grows linearly by definition and the 
efficiencies are complementary (EA = 0, EI = 1).  
The results presented so far considered that the same node removal rules (time-invariant 
attack) operated on the system until its complete destruction.  In many systems however, an 
adoptive “attack and recovery strategy” is applied, i.e., system performance is evaluated 
periodically, and especially in the early stages of the attack, to guide future actions.  It is 
understood, for example, that an attack strategy, which is optimal when evaluated over a long 
period of time might be suboptimal relative to a shorter time horizon.  Figure 3 (bottom panels) 
shows the results of the robustness-based ranking of attack strategies defined with respect to a 
partial (10%) system destruction.  Although both the strong dependence of robustness on   and 
the presence of crossovers is still observed, the crossover location moves closer to   = 1 with 
substantial divergence in the attack strategy rankings for   < 1.   The practical implications of 
this finding can be substantial; for example in a BA network   = 0.7 (which gives 70% weight to 
the AN and 30% to the IN) would remarkably re-rank the robustness of different attack strategies 
which for   = 1 would be indistinguishable (rightmost bottom panel plot of Fig. 3).  
To further illustrate the importance of the Idle Network in assessing system robustness, 
we consider data from the second largest European airline, RyanAir
17
. The examined network 
consists of 186 airports and 1507 edges that represent the existence of at least one weekly flight 
between the respective airports (Figure 4a). Figure 4b shows the robustness values for a 
sequential removal of airports until all of them are inoperative (100% removal), according to the 
three previously implemented attack strategies: RF, TA and RS.  The results are consistent with 
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our simulations:  (1) Random Failure generates complementary efficiencies (EA+EI ≈1). (2) 
Robustness ranking for the different strategies is similar to the BA network (see Figure 3) and 
the crossover between TA and RS is observed near α = 0.   Figure 4c shows the network 
robustness when the attack strategies act only until 19 airports are removed (10% node removal).  
Qualitatively, we have the same behavior as in the BA network (cf. Figure 3). However there 
exist significant quantitative differences, expressed in much lower values of robustness for 
   . This is due to the structure of the airline network (point-to-point), which has numerous 
connections among all the airports and hence relatively high connectivity degree for all nodes, 
not only the hubs. Thus, it is more likely to build-up clusters in the IN than hub-and-spoke scale-
free networks.  
To further illustrate why a value of     might be imperative to consider, in Fig 5 we 
display two transportation networks whose operative airport (AN) connectivity is 
indistinguishable under two different attacks but that of their inoperative airports (IN) is 
drastically different.  Since the largest cluster size in the Active network under both attacks is the 
same,        airports, the standard metric of robustness (     would rank them equally 
robust (see also Fig. 5c).  However, the largest cluster size in the IN of Fig. 5a is more than 6 
times bigger compared to the one shown in Figure 5b.  It is obvious that due to economic, 
logistic, security, and other aspects, both scenarios are significantly different.  Consider for 
instance the monetary losses, conceptually approximated by the amount of traffic lost due to 
removal of airports (temporarily due to weather, or permanently due to structural airline 
reorganization). We roughly approximate the lost traffic by the number of lost edges in the 
network, and use the largest cluster size in IN as a proxy for this quantity.  Naturally, losing a 
certain number of well-connected airports leads to more severe traffic losses than losing the same 
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number of disconnected airports. This difference is picked up by our robustness measure for 
     This example illustrates the necessity of incorporating a dual perspective framework in 
evaluating the overall robustness of a system under an attack by giving weight to the Idle 
Network, which has been systematically ignored in literature. 
 
Acknowledgments  
We acknowledge Hawoong Jeong and Jonathan Czuba for useful discussions. The research is 
supported by NSF grant EAR-1209402 under the Water Sustainability and Climate Program.  
 
References 
1. Watts, D. J. & Strogatz, S. H.  Collective dynamics of „small-world‟ networks. Nature 
393, 440 - 442 (1998). 
2. Barabasi, A. -L. & Albert, R.  Emergence of scaling in random networks. Science 286, 
509 - 512 (1999). 
3.  Albert, R., Jeong, H. & Barabasi, A. -L. Error and attack tolerance of complex networks. 
Nature 406, 378 - 381 (2000). 
4.  Cohen, R., Erez, K., ben-Avraham, D. & Havlin, S.  Resilience of the Internet to random 
breakdowns. Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 4626 - 4628 (2000). 
5.  Cohen, R., Erez, K., ben-Avraham, D. & Havlin, S.  Breakdown of the Internet under 
intentional attack. Phys. Rev. Lett. 86, 3682 - 3685 (2001). 
6.  Shargel, B., Sayama, H., Epstein, I.  & Bar-Yam, Y.  Optimization of robustness and 
connectivity in complex networks. Phys. Rev. Lett. 90, 068701 (2003). 
 11 
7.  Iyer, S., Killingback, T., Sundaram, B. & Wang, Z.  Attack robustness and centrality of 
complex networks. PloS ONE 8(4), e59613 (2013). 
8.  Callaway, D. S., Newman, M. E. J., Strogatz, S. H. & Watts, D. J.  Network robustness 
and fragility: percolation on random graphs. Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 5468 - 5471 (2000). 
9. Zaliapin, I., Foufoula-Georgiou, E. & Ghil, M.  Transport on river networks: A dynamic 
tree approach. J. Geophys. Res. Earth Surf. 115, F00A15 (2010). 
10. Burd, G. A., Waymire, E. C. & Winn, R. D.  A self-similar invariance of critical binary 
Galton-Watson trees. Bernoulli 6(1), 1-21 (2000). 
 
11. Zaliapin, I. & Kovchegov, Y. Tokunaga and Horton self-similarity for level set trees of 
Markov chains. Chaos, Solitons & Fractals 45(3), 358-372 (2012). 
 
12. Peckham, S.  New results for self-similar trees with applications to river networks. Water 
Resour. Res. 31, 1023 - 1029 (1995). 
 13. Zanardo, S., Zaliapin, I.  & Foufoula-Georgiou, E.  Are American rivers Tokunaga self-
similar? New results on river network topology and its climatic dependence. J. Geophys. Res. 
Earth Surf. 118, 1 - 18 (2013). 
14. Turcotte, D. L., Pelletier, J. D. & Newman, W. I.  Networks with side branching in 
Biology. J. theor. Biol. 193, 577 - 592 (1998). 
15. Turcotte, D. L., Holliday, J. R. & Rundle, J. B.  BASS, an alternative to ETAS. Geophys. 
Res. Lett. 34, L12303 (2007). 
16.     Rodriguez-Iturbe, I. & Rinaldo, A.  Fractal River Basins: Chance and Self-Organization. 
(Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
17.  Ryanair,  http://www.ryanair.com/,  Accessed: February 17, 2014. 
 
 
 12 
 
 
 
Table 1 Efficiencies for the three attack strategies applied to the lattice, T-tree and BA network  
Attack Lattice T-Tree BA Network 
Random Failure 
(RF) 
EA = 0.35 + 0.01 
EI  = 0.65 + 0.01 
EA = 0.58 + 0.10 
EI  = 0.39 + 0.10 
EA = 0.17 + 0.02 
EI  = 0.83 + 0.02 
Targeted Attack 
(TA) 
EA = 0.42 + 0.00 
EI  = 0.58 + 0.01 
EA = 0.87 + 0.04 
EI  = 0.75 + 0.04 
EA = 0.48 + 0.02 
EI  = 0.94 + 0.01 
Random Spreading 
(RS) 
EA = 0.02 + 0.02 
EI  = 1 
EA = 0.76 + 0.09 
EI = 1 
EA = 0.19 + 0.02 
EI  = 1 
EA (EI) is the efficiency of an attack strategy in destroying (building) the Active (Idle) network.  
Values in bold represent complementary efficiencies (EA + EI ≈ 1). 
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Figure 1 | Dual connectivity perspective in a simple line network. a, At time t = 0 the line network 
consists of seven nodes, all belonging to the Active Network (AN) shown as solid squares. At each time step, one 
node is removed to destroy the connectivity of the AN in the most efficient way.  b, Each removed node in the AN 
creates a node in the Idle Network (IN) shown as stripped squares.  The largest cluster size SA (SI) in the AN (IN) is 
shown by a solid line in panel c (d).  It is observed that SA and SI, evolve asymmetrically:  the most efficient 
procedure to reduce SA is not the most efficient to increase SI.  The efficiency of an attack has two components, EA 
and EI, one for each perspective, and their values are proportional to the gray area in panels e and f respectively.  
This illustrates that defining robustness in terms of only efficiency EA or in terms of both efficiencies EA and EI 
could make a significant difference in assessing the overall system robustness.  
 14 
 
Figure 2 | Dual perspective evolution of networks under attack. Evolution of the largest cluster size in the 
Active Network, AN (red) and Idle Network, IN (blue) for homogeneous (yellow panels) and heterogeneous (blue 
panels) networks with respect to three different sequential node removal strategies: panels b, f, j – random failure, c, 
g, k – targeted attack, and d, h, l – random spreading. The largest cluster size and time are normalized by the system 
size.  Three main observations are made: (i) the rate of decrease of the largest cluster size in the AN is not the same 
as the rate of increase of the largest cluster size in IN (asymmetric evolution);  (ii) for homogenous networks and 
networks under random failure, there is a symmetry with respect to the vertical axis at 0.5 implying a 
complementarity in the efficiencies of destroying AN and building-up IN, i.e. EA + EI    1; and (iii) for 
heterogeneous networks (T-Trees and BA networks) and heterogeneous attacks (TA and RS) no symmetry is 
observed at all, there is a necessity to monitor both networks (AN and IN) since it is not possible to predict the value 
of the efficiency of  building-up the IN from the efficiency value of destroying the AN and vice versa. 
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Figure 3 | Robustness, RN, as a function of the relative weight given to the connectivity of the Active 
Network (AN),  . The robustness defined exclusively in terms of the AN (  = 1) is shown by stars. For the top 
panels, the robustness of a homogeneous network subject to any attack and heterogeneous networks under random 
failure, is equal to 0.5 for   = 0.5 due to the property EA + EI ≈ 1. For all cases, notice (i) a strong dependence of 
robustness on  , (ii) robustness crossovers – changes in ranking (ordering of respective RN values) of different attack 
strategies depending on   and (iii) shift of the robustness crossovers towards   = 1 with substantial divergence in 
the attacks strategies when the system is evaluated not at the time of complete destruction but at its early stages of 
attack.   
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Figure 4 | Robustness, RN, of the second largest airline network in Europe. a, The map shows the 
connectivity of the second largest airline in Europe (RyanAir), operating in 186 airports (black squares), with more 
than 1500 routes (red lines).  b, shows the robustness of that network under three different attacks (Random Failure, 
Targeted Attack and Random Spreading), which act until all the airports are removed. In c, the robustness is 
evaluated under partial attack (10 % airports removed).  Note that for     , the network is equally robust under 
any of the three attacks.  However, for     the robustness values for different attack strategies significantly differ, 
highlighting the importance of the Idle Network in assessing the robustness of the system. 
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Figure 5 | Importance of the dual perspective framework in assessing network robustness. The maps 
illustrate the result of two different attacks, attack 1 and attack 2, applied to the network until 19 airports are 
disconnected (10% removal).  The two resulting networks have the same largest cluster size in the Active Network 
(      ), but different largest cluster size in the Idle Network: a,      for attack 1 and b,       for attack 2. 
Considering connectivity of the Idle Network in assessing the system robustness reveals significant differences in 
these two attacks, as quantified in c.    
